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THE INDIANA BILL OF RIGHTS
ROBERT TWOMLEY*

The first Bill of Rights for Indiana was created when
the constitutional convention of the Territory of Indiana
met at the Harrison County Court House at Corydon on June
10, 1816. The convention had met for the purpose of drafting a constitution for a state government, a necessary condition to becoming admitted into the Union as a state. There
was apparently no question but that a bill of rights should
constitute a part of this constitution.
Since there seemed to be a general desire to achieve
statehood by fall election time, the delegates wasted no time
in accomplishing the purpose for which they had come. The
convention itself was in session just twenty days, including
two Sundays, finishing its labors on Saturday,, June 29. The
Bill of Rights was handled with like speed and dispatch. On
Wednesday afternoon, June 12, the convention president,
Jonathan Jennings, who was shortly thereafter to become
the first governor of the state, appointed the committee on
the preamble and bill of rights. Two days later, the chairman of the committee, John Badollet, reported to the convention a proposed bill of rights consisting of twenty four
sections. Although no record of the debates of this convention was kept, it would appear from the convention journal
that these sections received little discussion, and were approved by the convention with only slight changes being
made.,
A glance at the members of the committee on the bill
of rights might explain to some extent why the proposed bill
of rights passed with so little change. They were for the
*

1.

Of the Illinois bar.
The amendment of section five was the main change made by
the convention to the bill of rights suggested by the committee.
The suggested section read: "That the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate." As finally adopted it read: "That in all
civil cases, where the value in controversy shall exceed the sum
of twenty dollars, and in all criminal cases, except in pdtit misdemeanors, which shall be punishable by fine only, not exceeding
three dollars, in such manner as the legislature may prescribe
by law, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." It is
interesting to note that the two provisions on this subject in the
constitution of 1851 sections 19 and 20 of Article I, reverted in
substance back to the section as proposed by the Committee in 1816.
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most part able men, some of whom were experienced in public
service. The chairman, John Badollet, a member of a prominent French family, was born in Geneva, Switzerland. He
came to Indiana Territory in 1800, became a lawyer in Knox
county, and in 1805 was appointed judge of the Court of
Chancery. At one time he was land officer at Vincennes.
Solomon Manwaring, a native of Delaware, was also a lawyer.
He was appointed judge of the court of Common Pleas in
1810, served in the Territorial Council from 1810 to 1816, and
starting in 1817 was associate judge in the Dearborn Circuit Court for two consecutive seven year periods. Dennis
Pennington was a very influential politician of Harrison
county. Though a man of little culture, he was said to be
"honest, firm, direct, open, frank. His mind was of fair
order, well stored with facts. As a speaker he was strong
without any pretense of eloquence. ' 2 He was several times
member of the Territorial legislature and was speaker of
the House in 1811 and 1815. James Smith, a lawyer from
Gibson county, had at different times filled offices of Mayor,
School Commissioner, and County Surveyor. He was also
at one time Justice of the Peace in Knox county, and captain of the militia. John K. Graham, of Clarke county, came
from Pennsylvania. Upon the Territory becoming the State
of Indiana, Graham served in the legislature in 1816. And
Daniel C. Lane, a lawyer from Harrison, was also active in
politics. He became at various times an associate judge
of a circuit, State Treasurer for seven years, and Representative in the State Legislature.
A comparison of the Indiana bill of rights of 1816 with
that of the Kentucky constitution of 1792, and that of the
Ohio constitution of 1803 indicates that little or no creative
thinking was spent in its formulation. The committeemen
saw their function as assembling the well settled principles
of government in the best form possible to fit the peculiar
needs of the state. Apparently the process was to pick and
choose among the various existing constitutions for the most
suitable provisions. Thus it is that an identical or almost
identical counterpart for nearly every provision in the Indiana bill of rights of 1816 can be found in either the Ohio
or the Kentucky constitutions above, and marked points of
2. Dunn, History of Indiana.
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similarity can be found in the early constitutions of Tennessee, and Pennsylvania as well.
While this bill of rights was in existence, it served the
state satisfactorily, for although, as was inevitable, as the
years went by, a number of defects were found in the constitution of 1816, the bill of rights was seldom the subject
of criticisn. Finally, however, in the annual election of August, 1849 the growing demand for certain constitutional revisions produced a majority vote favoring a constitutional
convention. At the convention, meeting pursuant to this
election, a committee on the preamble and bill of rights was
appointed with the able Robert Dale Owen named as chairman.3 Eventually, the bill of rights in its present form was
drafted and adopted.
This convention was not so prone to accept without
question the labors of the committee on the preamble and
bill of rights, and so, from time to time certain portions of
the proposed new bill of rights were subject to much discussion. Thus, in the first section of the bill of rights of 1851,
as submitted by the Committee, that provision of the Declaration of Independence which also had appeared in substance in the Indiana bill of rights of 1816, declaring that
all men are created equal, etc., had been omitted. Mr. Owen
explained the omission on the grounds that the convention
had not yet acted finally upon the proposed provisions establishing the rights of married women, and denying certain
rights to negroes and mulattoes, and that the defeat of the
former or the passage of the latter provision would be a
direct contradiction to the words of the Declaration of Independence demanded by some of the delegates. After much
debate, the submitted provision was amended to include the
words of the Declaration of Independence but omitting the
words describing the inalienable rights of all men as including the right "of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property.'
Section 21 of the Bill of Rights, providing for the manner of taking property for public use raised a hot debate
Other members of the committee on the preamble and bill of
rights included: John B. Niles, John A. Graham, William R.
Haddon, Hiram Prather, Joseph Coats, Elias Murray, Jacob P.
Chapman, and George Berry.
4. Debates and Proceedings of the Indiana Constitutional Convention
of 1850, Vol. I, pp. 952-964, 966-874.
3.
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between two conflicting interests, the rural land owners on
one side, and the urban corporate interests on the other. The
provision submitted by the committee provided for assessment of compensation for property taken by a jury of freeholders, and a requirement that the party taking the property must first tender compensation to the owner before
taking the property. The rural interests desired further
a provision prohibiting the enhancement of the value to the
remaining property caused by the proposed improvement
from being deducted from the damages assessed. The opposite side, of course, opposed all of these proposed changes
from the existing system of taking property for public use.
After several days' discussion, a provision was finally passed,
similar to the section originally submitted, with the exception that the provision for a jury of freeholders was omitted.5
Section 22, the provision on homestead exemption also
caused considerable discussion, with one faction desiring a
detailed provision setting forth the system of exemption to
be followed, the other faction opposing the principle of debtor's exemption altogether. In the end the opinion of Robert Owen prevailed-that although the principle of homestead exemption was good, the public was not ready for a
detailed provision in this constitution-and the provision
passed merely set out the principle and left the details to
be cared for by the legislature. In keeping with the tendency
to relieve the plight of the unfortunate debtor the last clause
of section 21, providing that "there shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in the case of fraud," was passed.6
Another important modification was made with respect
to the grand jury system. Under section 12 of the Bill of
Rights of 1816, the grand jury system was imperative. The
expense and inconvenience of this system when used when
only minor offenses were involved subjected it to criticism.
But since after much discussion of the subject the delegates
were unable to agree on a suitable substitute, a compromise
was effected by which the provision was omitted from the
Bill of Rights, and a provision that "The General Assembly
may modify or abolish the Grand Jury System" was carried.
5. Id., pp. 363-375, 382-394, 396-405, 406-420, 422-433, 436-438.
6. Id., 718-721, 746-775, 776-796, 802-805.
Ind. 536, 187 N.E. 337 (1933). With respect to the geographical
N.E. (2d) 977 (1936); Gerlot v. Swartz, 212 Ind. 292, 7 N.E. (2d)
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This became section 17 of Article VII of the Constitution
of 1851.7
Certain other changes were made without provoking
such discussion, such as the addition of such sections as
section 14, protecting against double jeopardy, section 23,
guaranteeing to citizens equal privileges and immunities;
and section 25, prohibiting laws the taking effect of which
depends upon any authority except as provided in the constitution.
Likewise, certain changes in form were made by expanding certain provisions of the earlier constitution and
contracting others.8
Also, certain sections which appeared in articles other
than the bill of rights in the constitution of 1816, were incorporated in the Bill of Rights in the constitution of 18519
The new Bill of Rights which was finally approved by
the convention was a much longer Bill of Rights, consisting
of thirty-seven sections. Some of the sections were common
sections, practically copied from the old Bill of Rights and
found in various other state constitutions as well as the
Federal Constitution. Others were new, and rather unusual.
Some of the sections were apparently clear in meaning;
others rather obscure. Some of the sections have come up
before the courts for construction and application time after
time; others have had little occasion to be judicially construed. The form and content of these sections have re7. Id., at pp: .135-160, 161-171, 173-199, 200-215. For debates on
other provisions of the Indiana Bill of Rights see Id., at 135, 161,
173, 200 (imprisonment for debt provision); Vol. II 1368 et seq.
8. For example section 3 of Article I of sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of
Article I of the Constitution of 1851, and section 6, providing that
"No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of
any religious or theological institution," and section 7, providing
that "No person shall be rendered incompetent as a witness, in
consequence of his opinions in matters of religion," were added.
On the other hand, sections 9 and 10 of the Bill of Rights of
1816, guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press, were set
out more briefly in somewhat broader terms in sections 9 and 10
of the Bill of Rights of 1851.
9. Thus section 18 in the constitution of 1851, providing that "The
penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and
not of vindictive justice was section 4 of Article IX in the Constitution of 1816. Likewise the treason provisions and the slavery provision in the Bill of Rights of 1851, sections 28, 29, and
37, were sections 23 and 7 of Article XI of the Constitution of
1816.
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mained unchanged since the time they were approved by
the convention.
But through constant court interpretation and occasional legislation these sections have been given life and
meaning. We now turn to a section by section examination
of the effect which these forces have had upon the guarantees of the Indiana Bill of Rights.
Section I. We Declare, That all men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness; that all power is inherent in the People; and
that all free governments are, and of right ought to be,
founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace,
safety, and well-being. For the advancement of these ends,
the People have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter
and reform their government.

This section consists of a rather contradictory combination of phrases taken from the Declaration of Independence and section 2 of the Constitution of 1816, setting out
two separate theories of government in the same paragraph.
In the first part the theory that all people are equally endowed with certain inalienable natural rights is stated.
But the latter part states that all power is inherent in the
people, and that to advance their peace, safety and well being, the people have the indefeasible right to alter and reform their government. The question may arise as to whether, under the latter part, the people may alter and reform
their government-searching for peace, safety, and well being of the people-to such an extent as to impair the natural
rights enumerated in the first part. If so, the second part
would seem to be the dominating part. If not, the idea of
natural rights of the individual would be given supremacy
and the statement in the second part can not be given its
face value.
The discussions in the constitutional convention of 1851
on this section throw some light on the question. The provision submitted to the convention by the committee on the
Bill of Rights as section 1 consisted only of the principles
set out in the latter part of the present section-that "All
power is inherent in the people," etc. But this was amended
by the Convention so as to include the words taken directly
from the Declaration of Independence setting out the natural
rights theory, and constituting the first part of the present
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section. It would seem that this provision was inserted by
the Convention for the purpose of further protecting the
rights of the individual and of qualifying the provision submitted by the committee.
However this may be, it still would appear that neither
the committee on the Bill of Rights nor the convention accredited this first part of section 1 with its face value, as
setting down unchanging, fundamental principles of government protecting the rights of the individual. If such had
been the feeling, the same respect would have been given
to section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of 1816,
which also enumerated certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights. Yet the permanence and unchangeability
of the inalienable rights set out in the Constitution of 1816
was not recognized by the majority of the convention. For
although much of the substance of section 1 of the Bill
of Rights of 1816 was adopted in the present section, still,
the statement of the inalienable right to acquire, possess and
protect property was omitted. It would seem that if this one
provision for inalienable rights could be done away with by
vote of the delegates of the people, coupled with ratification
by the people, the rest of the inalienable rights could go the
same way. It would follow that the provision that "all power
is inherent in the people" is the dominating part of section 1.
The question as to which of the two parts of section 1
dominate the other has not directly arisen in the cases. But
in a number of cases it has been contended that the first part
of section 1 of the Bill of Rights has been violated. These
decisions, though probably made without the above question
in mind, seem to indicate either that the first part is not the
dominating part of section 1, or else that the words "life,
liberty and pursuit of happiness," are to be construed so
narrowly as to give no individual protection other than is
provided by the other sections of the constitution.
For example, statutes denying the right to carry on
certain businesses, which have been attacked as conflicting
with section I, article I of the constitution, apparently with
the theory that the right to carry on a particular business
is essential to "liberty or pursuit of happiness," have generally been upheld as not violating section 1 of the Bill of Rights.
Thus a statute designed for the protection of the consuming
public as well as for the established local merchants, pro-
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hibiting transient merchants from transacting business without a license was upheld. Levy v. State, 161 Ind. 251, 68
N.E. 172 (1903). Likewise a more questionable statute requiring the payment of a prohibitive license fee for carrying
on the business of selling to merchants coupons, tickets,
or trading stamps to be given along with merchandise bought
by consumers and to be redeemed for money or goods was
held not in conflict with this section. Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173, 122 N.E. 584 (1918). (But
the statute was held to violate section 23 of Article 1 of
the Indiana Consituion; see Infra.) And in Farmers and
Merchants Co-operative Telephone Co. v. Boswell Telephone
Co. 187 Ind. 371, 119 N.E. 513 (1917) a statute requiring
a certificate of public convenience and necessity from a public service commission before granting a license to public
utilities for duplication of service was held to be a proper
exercise of the state's supervisory power.
Other statutes which, though not denying the right to
carry on certain businesses, materially impaired or interfered
with the carrying on of certain businesses have also been
held not violative of section 1 of the Bill of Rights. Thus,
Acts 1907, ch. 121, requiring owners and operators of coal
mines to provide suitable washrooms for their employees,
was upheld as being a proper exercise of the police power.
Booth v. State, 179 Ind. 405, 100 N.E. 563 (1912). Likewise an act prohibiting the use of "shoddy" (defined by
the act as old worn clothing, carpets, or other fabrics or
materials previously used), upon a showing that such material was unsanitary, in the manufacture of mattresses was
held constitutional. Weisenburger v. State, 202 Ind. 424, 175
N.E. 238 (1930). The contention that an act regulating
various phases of the milk business violated section 1, article
1, the court summarily dismissed saying, "Appellants were
certainly not serious in making the above contention." Albert
v. Milk Control Board of Indiana, 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E.
688 (1936). The fact that often the courts used the argument that there was a proper exercise of the police power
to answer the contention that the statute violated section 1
of the constitution indicates the absence of any feeling that
the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness was absolutely inalienable. 10
10.

Under the police power the state may tax, regulate, or prohibit
the sale of liquor. Jordan v. Evansville, 163 Ind. 512, 72 N.E.
544 (1904); Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623,
120 N.E. 19 (1918). It may regulate public utilities, in some
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Another type of statute, often attacked as impairing
the right to life, liberty and happiness is the statute designed to protect the economic interests of certain classes
of people by placing limitations on their liberty to contract,
and on the liberty of contract of those dealing with them.
Generally these statutes have been upheld. A statute prohibiting any assignment of wages to be earned in the future
by any laborer, and making such an assignment invalid was
held valid. International Text Book Co. v. Weissinger, 160
Ind. 349, 65 N.E. 521 (1902). Similarly, an act prohibiting
cases, by enacting measures to prevent destructioa of competition
by such practices as discriminating between express companies
in the receipt and carriage of goods; Adams Express Co. v. State,
161 Ind. 328, 67 N.E. 1033 (1903); and in other cases by enacting measures to prevent competition, such as requiring new businesses entering a particular field of public service to obtain certificates
of public convenience and necessity from the state. Farmers
Telephone Co. v. Boswell Telephone Co., 187 Ind. 371, 119 N.E.
513 (1918).
The state may require a telephone company to provide such additional facilities for toll service as to enable another
company to provide adequate long distance service to other towns,
although the compensation allowed at the time for the additional
services might be inadequate. McCardle v. Akron Telephone Co.,
87 Ind. App. 59, 160 N.E. 48 (1927).
The state may also regulate certain legitimate businesses for the purpose of protecting
the consuming public from possible fraud, such as by authorizing
city ordinances regulating the businesses of transient merchants;
Levy v. State, 161 Ind. 251, 68 N.E. 172 (1903); or regulating
the auctioneering of jewelry and valuable metals. Gordon v. Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 79, 183 N.E. 124 (1932). For the purpose of
protecting public health the state may regulate the disposal of
garbage, although the effect is to ruin the businssses of private
individuals collecting kitchen refuse from restaurants and cafeterias. Indianapolis v. Ryan, 212 Ind. 447, 7 N.E. (2d) 974 (1937).
And on the same grounds it may validly enact provisions designed
to eliminate unfair trade practices and to stabilize production in
the milk business. Albert v. Milk Control Bord v. Crescent
Creamery Inc., 210 Ind. 283, 14 N.E. (2d) 588 (1938). A parking
meter does not deprive an adjacent lot-owner of his right of
ingress and egress. Andrews v. Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E.
(2d) 968 (1942).
As to zoning ordinances, see South Bend v.
Marckle, 215 Ind. 74, 18 N.E. (2d) 764 (1938); as regards the
taking of an electric utility by a city, see, Public Service Co. v.
Lebanon, 221 Ind. 78, 46 N.E. (2d) 480 (1942).
Thus when the
legislature has passed provisions for the purpose of protecting
the health, morals, and general welfare of the public under its
police power, the courts will not interfere merely because certain
property rights of individuals have been impaired.
Apparently, however, the Indiana court has not accepted
purely aesthetic legislation as an exercise of the police power, for
it has said that while the building of bill boards may be regulated
by ordinance, the government cannot without prcviding compensation therefor, require to be removed bill boards which are not
nuisances per se: i.e. bill boards which are kept clean and sightly,
are properly constructed and fire proofed, and advertise accredited commodities. General Outdoors Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930).
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the assignment of wages, earned as well as unearned, by a
married man without the consent of his wife was upheld.
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 182 Ind. 280, 105 N.E. 570 (1914). And a statute
making it a criminal offence for an Indiana creditor to assign a claim against an Indiana debtor to one outside of the
state for purposes of collection, in order to avoid the Indiana
debtor's exemption laws was also upheld. Markley v. Murphy, 180 Ind. 4, 102 N.E. 376 (1913).
Other statutes definitely limiting the liberty of contract
in certain situations which have been attacked as violating
the above constitutional provision include the Indiana Bulk
Sales Act, the Indiana statute prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade, and the Teachers Tenure Law. These statutes, on various grounds, were held valid. Hirth-Krause Co.
v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 97 N.E. 1 (1912); Knight and Jillson
Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N.E. 823 (1908); Ratcliff v.
Dick Johnson School Twp., 204 Ind. 525, 185 N.E. 143 (1933) ;
Brumfield v. State ex rel. Wallace, 206 Ind. 265, 190 N.E.
863 (1984).
The inalienable right to life, liberty and pursuit of
happiness have also been interpreted by the Indiana courts
as not including the right to vote, Mosley v. Board of County
Commr's., 200 Ind. 515, 165 N.E. 241 (1929); the right of
the local government to levy local taxes, Zoercher v. Alger,
202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186 (1930) ; Dunn v. City of Indianapolis, 208 Ind. 630, 196 N.E. 528 (1935); and the right
to peacefully picket the premises of another, Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N.E. 550 (1924).
There have been certain statutes interfering with the
freedom to make contracts, dealing with relations between
employer and employee, and allegedly for the purpose of
protecting the welfare of the laboring class, which have
been held to violate the above constitutional provision. A
statute requiring every employer to make weekly payments
of the full amount due to his employees for their labor to
within six days of the time of payment was held a violation
of article 1, section 1 of the state constitution. Republic
Iron Co v. State, 160 Ind., 379, 66 N.E. 1005 (1902). And
in Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66
N.E. 895 (1903), it was stated in effect that a minimum
wage law, applying to the work and affairs of private citi-
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zens, would be unconstitutional. However, neither case carries much weight to show that the life, liberty and pursuit of
happiness clause places definite limitations upon the power
of the people, through their representatives, to legislate,
since in each instance other grounds for invalidity were also
stated.
In another case, which did not involve the constitutionality of a statute, but rather the right of a woman to practice law, the Indiana court indicated an extremely lax attitude towards natural or inalienable rights. In sustaining
the woman's right to practice law, the court spoke of the
"higher" law "which accords to every citizen the natural
right to gain a livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts, sciences, the professions, or other vocations." The court then followed with, "This right may not,
of course, be pursued in violation of the laws, but must be
held to exist as long as not forbidden by law." Apparently
the "natural" right spoken of in this case was subordinate
to man made law. In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 34 N.E. 641
(1893).
It would appear, from the action of the constitutional
convention of 1850, with reference to the first section of the
Bill of Rights of 1816, and from the various court decisions
since the changed section 1 was incorporated in the Bill of
Rights of 1851, that the first part of section 1 is not a
potent part of the constitution in the sense that its sections
must be interpreted carefully and followed strictly, but is
rather a general statement of a persuasive principle which
should act as a guide post for the various functions of the
government.
Power of the people to alter existing government. In
two cases Indiana Courts have interpreted the latter part
of section 1, article 1. In Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind.
336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912) it was held that this section did
not authorize the legislature to draft a new constitution making various changes in the old constitution, and pass it as a
law which provided therein that the proposed organic instrument be submitted to the voters at general election. And,
by Bennett v. Jackson, 186 Ind. 553, 116 N.E. 921 (1917),
the legislature can not take the initiative to call a constitutional convention for the purpose of drafting a new constitution. Since the present constitution did not describe a
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method for calling a convention, custom should prevail. And
according to custom, calling a constitutional convention must
first have the approval of the people, before the legislature
gives its assent by passing an act providing for the election
of delegates to the constitutional convention.
Section II.

All men shall be secured in their natural

right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of

their own consciences.

An emergency order of the Board of Health and Charities of Indianapolis excluded school children who had not
been vaccinated for small pox. In effort to enjoin the carrying out of this order it was contended, among other things,
that the order was invalid as violating sections 2, 3 and 4
of article 1 of the Indiana Constitution. It was not stated
in the argument or brief how such religious matters were
violated, but the probable basis of this contention was that
the order infringed upon the rights of those who had religious objections to such medical practices. The court upheld
the validity of the order, pointing out that the right to
require vaccination was not in question here; merely a
provision that unless a child is vaccinated he may not go
to school while the emergency lasts. Vonnegut v. Baun,
206 Ind. 172, 188 N.E. 677 (1934).
Section III. No law shall, in any case whatever, control
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or

interfere with the rights of conscience.

The Indiana Supreme Court has consistently held that
laws forbidding persons from pursuing on Sunday their
regular labors or businesses do not conflict with section 4
of the Bill of Rights. Thus the court has upheld the convictions under such statutes for selling liquor on Sunday;
Voglesong v. State, 9 Ind. 112 (1857).
Section 4 obviously prohibits legislation creating an established religion, or legislation directly encouraging the
people to give support to one creed or religious belief while
discouraging them from giving support to another. But the
above cases indicate that section 4 is not to be construed as
prohibiting legislation regulating the conduct of the people
for their own social good, even though the conduct encouraged is incidentally the same conduct as is favored by various religious creeds. See Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93
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N.E. 1071 (1910); State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind.
348, 28 N.E.(2d) 256 (1940).
Section V. No religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of trust or profit.
(No annotations.)
Section VI. No money shall be drawn from the treasury,
for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.
The Indiana Division of Public Health has questioned
the Attorney General of the State: Can the Indiana Division
of Public Health furnish drugs or medicine to private or
denominational institutions for the treatment of inmates
who are infected with communicable diseases, even though
they may be accepting cases in these institutions who are
public wards, some of whom are also on per diem public
expense? In the opinion of the attorney general this could
not be done. It is apparent from sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
that there was intended to be an absolute separation of the
State and Church in their respective fields. It would be a
violation of Section 6 to furnish drugs to the institution to
enable it to carry on its work. If the drugs be furnished at
all, they would have to be furnished to the individual receiving the treatment pursuant to some law. Opinions of
the Attorney General of Indiana, 1934, p. 358. From this
interpretation it would seem that under section 6 the state
may not give support to any religious institution to carry
out certain activities even though such activities could properly be made a function of an agency of the state.
Section VII. No person shall be rendered incompetent
as a witness, in consequence of his opinions on matters of
religion.
(No annotations.)
Section IX. No law shall be passed, restraining the free
interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right
to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever:
but for the abuse of that right every person shall be responsible.
The Indiana Supreme Court in its decisions involving this
section has not followed a very strong policy in protecting
the right of free speech. But in the light of more recent
Federal Supreme Court decisions, it would appear that the
Indiana decisions are no longer the law. Thus, the Indiana
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Supreme Court held, under a city ordinance making it unlawful to carry, on any public, street or alley or other
public place, any banner, placard, advertisement or handbill
for the purpose of displaying the same, held that a striker
convicted under this act for walking back and forth in front
of a barber shop wearing an oil cloth shirt having the inscription "Barber Shop Unfair to Organized Labor" was not
denied the right of free speech. The court said the defendant
may hire a hall or print a paper, but the city has authority
to place such restrictions upon the use of its streets as to
as nearly as possible allow all to enjoy them and to prevent
possibility of disturbance. Watters v. Indianapolis, 191 Ind.
671, 134 N.E. 482 (1921). But the Federal Supreme Court
ruling that city ordinances prohibiting the distribution of
hand bills in public places were a violation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech probably overruled this case.
Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct.
146 (1939) ; see Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct.
666 (1938). In the Schneider case it was said that the motive of the legislation to prevent the littering of the streets
was insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a
person from rightfully handing literature to one willing to
receive it. Likewise in the Watters case it could be said that
the motive of the ordinance to prevent crowds gathering on
the streets and prevent possibility of disturbance, would not
justify prohibiting a person from expressing himself by the
described means without such undesired consequences following.
In Thomas v. City of Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145
N.E. 450, an ordinance prohibiting all acts of picketing was
held not to violate section 9. This is no longer the law in
Indiana. The United States Supreme Court, in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940), has held a
statute similar to the above ordinance unconstitutional as
denying the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
And prior to this decision, an Indiana statute providing that
no court shall issue restraining orders against persons giving
publicity to a labor dispute whether by advertising, speaking,
patroling or by any method not involving fraud or violence
was held to make such an ordinance invalid. Local Union
No. 26 v. Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N.E. (2d) 624 (1937).
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Section X. In all prosecutions for libel, the truth of the
matters alleged to be libelous may be given in justification.

Under this section it was held that in defense to a
criminal prosecution for libel it is not necessary to show that
the words spoken were both true and made in good faith.
If the words published were, in fact, true, whether published
in good faith or not, defendants are not guilty of the crime
charged. State v. Bush, 122 Ind. 42, 23 N.E. 677 (1889).
Similarly truth alone was held a defense to a civil action for
libel. Palmer v. Adams, 137 Ind. 72, 36 N.E. 695 (1893).
Section XI. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable

search, or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.

Search and seizure without warrant. Under this section
all searches and seizures made without a search warrant
must be "reasonable" searches and seizures. And in determining what may be "reasonable" and what may be "unreasonable" searches and seizures, the court has upheld certain statutes requiring individuals and business enterprises
on certain occasions to open their otherwise private books
to inspection by public officials. Thus the constitutionality
of a statute giving various taxing agencies the right to inspect the books of public officers, corporations, and taxpayers of the state for the purpose of properly listing and assessing property for tax purposes was upheld. Cooperative
Building and Loan Assn. v. State, 156 Ind. 463, 60 N.E. 146
(1900) ; Washington National Bank v. Daily, 166 Ind. 631, 77
N.E. 53 (1906); cf. Applegate v. State, 158 Ind. 119, 63
N.E. 16 (1900). Also, a city ordinance placing upon every
licensed pawn broker the duty to keep detailed records of
every transaction made, including a record of the party
pawning the article as well as a description of the article
itself, which record shall be open to police inspection, was
held no violation of the searches and seizures provision.
Schuman v. Fort Wayne, 127 Ind. 109, 26 N.E. 560 (1890);
cf. Medias v. City of Indianapolis, 216 Ind. 155, 23 N.E.
(2d) 590 (1939).
A proper search of a person and his effects may also
be made without warrant when such a person is lawfully
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arrested. Thus, when the defendant was arrested and put
in jail for stealing a quantity of white corn from a crib,
and it was noticed that the shoes he wore bore a striking
resemblance to the tracks found near the corn crib, the
fact that the sheriff and several others used necessary force
to take defendant's shoes off did not amount to an unlawful
search and seizure. Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200, 167 N.E.
129 (1929). And it is not always necessary that the arrest
be made with a warrant. Individuals may be arrested for
committing a misdemeanor, such as speeding, in the presence
of a peace officer or some other person. Under such circumstances the officers have the right to search their persons,
and the contents of their car, and to seize any evidence found
therein which might involve them in an entirely separate
offence, such as the illegal transportation of liquor. Hayerstick v. State, 196 Ind. 145, 147 N.E. 625 (1924); Jameson
v. State, 196 Ind. 483, 149 N.E. 51 (1925); Dafoff v. State,
198 Ind. 701, 153 N.E. 398 (1926). Similarly, a person arrested without a warrant while in the act of committing a
felony is not immune from a search of his person and effects, including the vehicle he is using to aid in its commission. Thomas v. State, 196 Ind. 234, 146 N.E. 850 (1924) ;
Al
Pettit v. State, 207 Ind. 478, 188 N.E. 784 (1934).
he
when
though an officer may arrest without a warrant
or
has
is
being
a
felony
believe
grounds
to
has reasonable
been committed, when he makes an arrest without such reasonable grounds the search and seizure following cannot be
justified even by the fact that a felony actually was being
committed. Hart v. State, 195 Ind. 384, 145 N.E. 492 (1925) ;
Morgan v. State, 197 Ind. 374, 151 N.E. 98 (1925); Boyd
v. State, 198 Ind. 55, 152 N.E. 278 (1926).
A lawful search and seizure may also be made without
warrant when permission to do so is given by the owner and
possessor of the premises.' Shade v. State, 196 Ind. 665, 149
N.E. 348 (1925). And it has been held that the constitutional inhibitions referring to "persons, homes, papers and
effects" does not make a warrant necessary to search fields,
woods, or land some distance from the house. Williams v.
State, 201 Ind. 175, 166 N.E. 663 (1929).
Search and Seizure with warrant. Sometimes it is not
enough to justify a search and seizure by the fact that it
was made under a search warrant. •For the warrant must
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be properly made out and issued-by the terms of the constitution, must be issued "upon probable cause, supported
by oath and affirmation" and must describe particularly "the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized"in order to make lawful the action taken under it. There
has been some confusion in the Indiana cases as to what is
necessary to meet the requirement of "probable cause." Apparently the past practice in obtaining a search warrant
had been for the issuing officer to take evidence, oral or
otherwise, as to what "probable cause" there was for the
issuance thereof, and then issue it to the demanding officer
upon his affidavit that "he believed or had reason to believe" that the persons whose premises were t:) be searched
were violating the law, etc. With respect to this procedure
it was held that a warrant could not be validly issued on
such an affidavit of information and belief alone, when there
was no showing that any evidence of probable cause was
taken to support it. Wallace v. State, 199 Ind. 317, 157 N.E.
657 (1927); State v. Blystone, 200 Ind. 173, 162 N.E. 233
(1928). But among the later cases a conflict arose as to
whether or not the facts as to probable cause given in evidence should also be made a part of the affidavit. At first
the view was that this was not necessary. Gwinn v. State,
201 Ind. 420, 166 N.E. 769 (1929). But later cases held
that it was. Bedenarzik v. State, 204 Ind. 517, 185 N.E.
114 (1933); Dranik v. State, 204 Ind. 661, 185 N.E. 514
(1933). This confusion has been settled in favor of the
later cases by an amendment to section 9-602 Burns Ind.
Stat. (1933), providing that in the affidavit filed for the
purpose of obtaining issuance of the search warrant there
must be set forth "the facts then in knowledge of affiant
constituting probable cause." Also "If any other evidence
be heard for the purpose of establishing probable cause,
such evidence shall be reduced to writing and filed with the
affidavit for the search warrant." See also Barrar v. State,
207 Ind. 706, 193 N.E. 94 (1934).
The phrase, "particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized," has been
strictly and carefully construed by the Indiana courts to
prevent any warrants which might give to the officer any
discretion as to the premises to be searched, or property to
be seized. Any warrants containing such a description as
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would cover a number of residences rather than a single one
have been consistently held invalid. Flum v. State, 193 Ind.
585, 141 N.E. 353 (1923) ; State v. Phipps, 194 Ind. 459,'143
N.E. 287 (1923) ; Le Juste v. State, 197 Ind. 327, 150 N.E.
7951 (1925); Muleff v. State, 198 Ind. 686, 154 N.E. 670
(1926); see also Bumen v. State, 203 Ind. 237, 179 N.E.
716 (1931). On the other hand, a warrant specifically describing premises but stating that the name of the owner
is unknown, Boyd v. State, 195 Ind. 213, 143 N.E. 355 (1924),
or a warrant describing a two story building as 214 and
2141/2 Wabash Avenue, Hess v. State, 198 Ind. 1, 151 N.E.
405 (1926), is not so indefinite as to be held invalid.
Consequences of an improper search and seizure. Naturally, if a statute violated the searches and seizures provision, it would be declared unconstitutional, and if an individual such as a public officer were to violate the provision by an unlawful search or seizure, he would be individually liable. Carey v. Sheets, 67 Ind. 375 (1879). But
there is a conflict among the various jurisdictions as to
whether or not a further remedy should exist, namely, that
if evidence has been obtained against an accused person in
violation of his privilege against unreasonable searches and
seizures, it should be suppressed and declared incompetent.
Indiana has followed the Federal rule that this further remedy does exist. Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 138 N.E.
817 (1922). And in accord with the Federal rule, the Indiana appellate court has held that when the party has notice ahead of trial that certain evidence has been obtained
by illegal search and seizure he must make the motion to
suppress the evidence before the actual commencement of
the trial in order to avail himself of. this remedy. Goebel
v. State, 89 Ind. App. 328, 166 N.E. 466 (1928) ; Boston v.
State, 89 Ind. App. 583, 166 N.E. 448 (1929); Foster v.
State, 89 Ind. App. 586, 166 N.E. 447 (1929); McSwain
v. State, 89 Ind. App. 592, 166 N.E. 444 (1929); Eichoff
v. State, 89 Ind. App. 606, 166 N.E. 445 (1929); Hantz v.
State, 92 Ind. App. 108, 166 N.E. 439 (1930).
It is well settled that the right to suppress evidence
obtained by illegal searches and seizures is a personal right,
Frye v. State, 197 Ind. 515, 151 N.E. 728 (1925), belonging
only to those having a proprietary interest in the property
violated. Thus, when, during prohibition, A promised X, a
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19-year old farm hand, living in the tenant house on a farm,
$59 for the license to run a still in an upstairs room in the
house, the fact that officers found the still under a defective
search warrant could not be objected to by A, since he had
no proprietary interest in the premises searched under the
defective warrant. Snedegar v. State, 196 Ind. 254, 146 N.E.
849, 147 N.E. 918 (1925) ; Earle v. State, 194 Ind. 165, 142
N.E. 405 (1923). And the Indiana court has made an interesting extension of this rule to the effect that when the
defendant on trial denies that he has any connection with
the premises illegally searched and the evidence illegally
seized he is thereby precluded from standing upon his right
under section 11 to suppress this evidence, even though the
jury by its verdict of guilty find hat he has an interest
in such property. Speybroeck v. State, 198 Ind. 683, 154
N.E. 1 (1926).
Section XII. All courts shall be open; and every man for
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation shall
have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely and without
denial; speedily and without delay.

1. The phrase, "all courts shall be open" is so indefinite
and general that it could be interpreted in a number of ways,
including that court proceedings should be open to public
observation, or that every person may have his legal differences settled in a court of competent jurisdiction of the
type known to common law. The guarantee of public trial,
however, is covered more specifically in section 13, and the
idea of an absolute right to have all legal differences settled
in a common law court is not supported by the cases. See
Lake Erie and W. R. Co. v. Watkins, 157 Ind. 600, 62 N.E.
443 (1902); Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman, 204 Ind. 122,
179 N.E. 778 (1932); Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216
Ind. 114, 23 N.E. (2d) 472 (1939). Re, a new party's right
to sue, see Dodd v. Reese, 216 Ind. 449, 24 N.E. (2d) 995
(1939).
The Indiana cases throw no light on the meaning of
this section. An appellate court case merely held that this
phrase guaranteed a litigant not only the right to institute
a suit but also to prosecute it to its final judgment, unless
the litigant forfeits his right by vexatious conduct. Sellers
v. Myers, 7 Ind. App. 148, 34 N.E. 496 (1893). Concerning
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application to picketing cases, see Scofes v. Helmar, 205 Ind.
596, 187 N.E. 662 (1933).
It is unfortunate that the framers of this section did
not set out the purpose of this section in more clear terms,
for at present it would seem to have little effect as a guarantee of the rights of the individual.
2. The provision that "every man for injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation shall have remedy
by due course of law" has apparently for its counterpart in
the Federal Constitution the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. But the federal due process provision
has been extended by the Supreme Court of the United States
so as to preclude any state action which impairs the obligation of contracts, denies equal protection of the laws, takes
private property for public use without compensation, denies freedom of speech and of the press, religious freedom,
and the right to counsel, and various other rights and privileges of the individual. See Willis, Constitutional Law, p.
655. Since these guaranties have been covered in the state
constitution by separate provisions, the scope of the state
"due course of the law" clause is much narrower.
This clause might easily have been interpreted as protecting only those fundamental principles of judicial procedure of notice, opportunity to be heard before an impartial
tribunal, and under an orderly course of procedure, in determining the legal rights and liabilities of the individual.
Kizer v. Town of Winchester, 141 Ind. 694, 40 N.E. 265
(1895) ; Bowlin v. Cochran, 161 Ind. 486, 69 N.E. 153 (1903) ;
Freeman v. Pierce, 179 Ind. 445, 101 N.E. 478 (1912). However, as will be shown, the Indiana cases indicate that this
clause might be considered as guaranteeing substantive
rights as well.
With respect to the procedural rights guaranteed under this section several Indiana cases involve the validity
of proceedings provided by statute for the assessment and
levy of special assessments for local public improvements.
It has been held that the fact that the same body that makes
the initial assessments conducts the hearing is no valid objection. Dawson v. Hipskind, 173 Ind. 216, 89 N.E. 863
(1909). And it is sufficient if notice and hearing before an
impartial tribunal be given before the assessment becomes
final and conclusive. Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 182

1945]

THE INDIANA BILL OF RIGHTS

231

Ind. 36, 105 N.E. 496 (1914). Another statute restricting
the manner of contesting the validity of any contract for any
public improvement to a suit to enjoin performance brought
within ten days from the execution of the contract or prior
to the commencement of work thereunder, was also held
not to violate this section. Wooley v. Indiana Asphalt Pavement Co., 187 Ind. 575, 120 N.E. 597 (1918). And a statute
directing a circuit or superior court to render judgment in
terms of an order or award of the Industrial Accident Board,
without provision for any hearing between the parties on
the award was held not a violation of section 12. The legislature could and did give the Industrial Accident Board authority to investigate and pass on the facts of each industrial
accident case, and to determine the award, and that award
was the equivalent to the finding of a court or verdict of
a jury. There was no need for a hearing to precede the
judgment of the court. Grant Coal Mining Co. v. Coleman,
204 Ind. 122, 179 N.E. 778 (1932). See also State v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1930); Steve v. Colosimo,
211 Ind. 673, 7 N.E. (2d) 983 (1936); Warren v. Indiana
Telephone Co., 26 N.E. (2d) 399 (1940); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Dowling, 111 Ind. App., 256, 37 N.E. (2d)
684 (1941).
In the cases in which this section has been raised in
effort to defend some substantive rights, the court has generally held that such impairments of rights had been validly
made under the proper exercise of the police power. Thus
the validity of statutes providing in certain instances for
recovery of attorneys' fees along with the recovery of damages on the principal cause of action has been upheld under
the state police power. Terre Haute & L. R. Ry. Co. v. Salmond,
161 Ind. 131, 67 N.E. 918 (1903); Brown v. Central Bermudez Co., 162 Ind. 452, 69 N.E. 150 (1903); Pittsburg
C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Taber, 168 Ind. 419, 77 N.E. 741
(1906); Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Schmuck, 181 Ind.
323, 103 N.E. 325 (1913). A statute providing for the incorporation of cemeteries with boards of managers who shall
have authority to levy assessments on the lots in the cemetery, not to exceed 20% of the value of these lots for the
purpose of maintaining, improving and enlarging upon the
grounds, was upheld as a proper delegation of the police
power of the state. Paul v. Walkerton, etc. Cemetery Ass'n.,
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204 Ind. 693, 184 N.E. 537 (1932). And in Sherfy v. Brazil,
213 Ind. 493, 13 N.E. (2d) 568 (1938), the sixty-day limitation period for suing a municipality, construed to apply to
a nine year old child, was held to be like any other statute
of limitations, founded on state policy for public welfare
and a proper restriction on the right of remedy. It was also
held that the legislature may abolish such civil actions as
those based on alienation of a wife's affections without
violating section 12, since such liability is an incident of the
marriage relations and as such is under legislative control.
Although it was said in the opinion that a man's right to
his wife's affection was not "property" within the meaning
of this section, it is clear that the real grounds for the decision was in the police power of the legislature to control the
marriage status. Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10
N.E. (2d) 619 (1937).
The fact that the Indiana Court has justified such impairments of substantive rights under the police power of
the state, rather than holding merely that the "due course"
of law clause does not protect substantive rights, would indicate that the court feels that this section, like the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, may
include certain substantive rights within its protection.
3. The provision that "Justice shall be administered
freely and without purchase," having its foundation in the
Magna Charta, was intended as a death blow to such corrupt and disgraceful practices as requiring payment of fines
for such court concessions as granting justice, having proceedings speeded, or having proceedings slowed or stopped.
So far as Indiana is concerned there has been no necessity
to employ the provision for such a purpose. However, one
cannot expect to get the benefit of a court proceeding or court
process and pay nothing. Even one defending a criminal
charge as a poor man and thereby being furnished with free
counsel may not demand that a copy of the evidence be furnished to him free of charge, although such a copy may be
necessary in order to appeal. Ex Parte Morgan, 122 Ind.
428, 23 N.E. 863 (1889). Likewise, it is proper for the sheriff
under statutory authorization to make charges for his services on the commission basis. Henderson v. State, 137 Ind.
552, 36 N.E. 257 (1893); State v. Laramore, 175 Ind. 478,
94 N.E. 761 (1911).

1945]

THE INDIANA BILL OF RIGHTS

4.

There are no Indiana cases interpreting the provi-

sion that "Justice shall be administered . . . completely

and without denial," and hence no more force can be attributed to this phrase than to the statement that "all courts
shall be open."
5. Although there are practical difficulties involved
in complying with the direction that "Justice shall be administered . . . speedily and without delay," when attempts

are made by legislation to relieve the congestion blocking
the speedy disposal of cases, this section has been relied
upon to sustain the validity of the statute. This was done
in upholding a statute providing that the jurisdiction of all
appeals now pending or hereafter taken in certain minor
criminal cases is hereby vested in the appellate court in
order to relieve congestion on the Supreme Court docket.
However, the fact that speedy justice is not given, by reason
of a series of prosecutions, convictions, appeals, and reversals
does not justify the defendant's release on a writ of habeas
corpus. Kinningham v. Dickey, 123 Ind. 180, 24 N.E. 1048
(1890).
Section XIII. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in
the county in which the offense shall have been committed;
to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, and have a copy thereof;
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.

1. The provision for the right to public trial is probably intended to protect the individual from such secret
criminal proceedings as existed in the days of the court of
Star Chamber, and even exist today in those countries where
the power of the government relies to a great extent upon
the activities of the secret police. In this country since
quite often the court room is not large enough to accommodate all members of the public interested in the trial, and
since the right of the judge on certain occasions to remove
spectators from the court room is well recognized, it is clear
that this section is not an absolute guarantee to the public
of the right to attend trial. However, from federal decisions
it would seem that the right is guaranteed to the accused
to have present at the trial a certain group of persons, including representatives of the press, friends of the accused,
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and selected representatives of the general public. Reagan
v. U.S., 202 Fed. 488 (C.C.A. 9th Circ., 1913); Davis v. U.S.,
247 Fed. 394 (C.C.A. 8th Circ., 1917).
An Indiana case held that this section does not necessarily require that all proceedings related to the trial take place
in the court room. The formal declaration of sentence
given in a room other than the usual court room is proper
where the court gave proper notice that it was in session
and there was full opportunity for those interested to be
present. Reed v. State, 147 Ind. 41, 46 N.E. 135 (1896).
2. Under the guarantee of trial by impartial jury a
conviction may be reversed when the conviction was clearly
the result of a partial jury. On the other hand, mere irregularities in selecting and maintaining the jury, which
might have some remote effect on the partiality of the jury,
are not reversible error, when there is no showing that the
verdict was the result of a partial jury. Thus the mere fact
that the trial court arbitrarily requires the defense to make
its voir dire examination of the jury first does not of itself
violate the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.
Hicks v. State, 199 Ind. 401, 156 N.E. 548 (1927) ; see Harding v. Minas 206 Ind. 661, 190 N.E. 862 (1934). And, although there was a reversal when upon voir dire examination
a juryman untruthfully answered a question as to whether or
not he knew a particular person involved in the case, it was
pointed out that the evidence upon which defendant was convicted was very weak. Foreman v. State, 203 Ind. 324, 180
N.E. 291 (1931). But when the evidence sufficiently shows
that there has been intentional and arbitrary discrimination
in the selection of persons to be drawn as jurors, excluding
a class of persons on account of sex, race, or color, it is
grounds for reversal. Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231, 195
N.E. 268 (1935); cf. Swain v. State, 215 Ind. 259, 18 N.E.
(2d) 921 (1939). A person charged with a crime may waive
his right to trial by jury and agree to trial by the court.
Brown v. State, 219 Ind. 251, 37 N.E. (2d) 73, 137 A.L.R.
679 (1941).
Under the general guarantee of a right to jury trial, it
has been held that there is no right to have the jury assess
the amount of punishment to be inflicted. This is within
the province of the legislature. It can set the punishment
itself, or authorize other agencies such as the judge, the
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reformatory board, or the jury to set the punishment. Mack
v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 180 N.E. 279 (1931); Stevens v. Anderson, 145 Ind. 304, 44 N.E. 460 (1896); Miller v. State,
149 Ind. 607, 49 N.E. 894 (1897).
3. Under the provision giving the individual charged
with a crime the privilege of trial in the county where the
offense was committed, a defendant who commits the crime
of burglary in one county, and transports the stolen goods
into another county may not be prosecuted for both crimes
in the latter county. Martin v. State, 176 Ind. 317, 95 N.E.
1001 (1911). However, this provision protects only the right
to trial, and does not require that indictment be brought
in the county where the offense was committed. Welty v.
Ward, 164 Ind. 457, 73 N.E. 889 (1904). And when a crime
is committed the incidents of which cover more than one
county, such as a murder wherein the mortal wound is inflicted in one county and the death occurs in another, prosecution can be brought in either county involved. Peats v.
State, 213 Ind. 560, 12 N.E. (2d) 270 (1938). As to. what
constitutes a criminal prosecution, see State ex rel. Cutsinger
v. Spencer, 219 Ind. 148, 41 N.E. (2d) 601 (1941).
4. The right to be heard by counsel has been said to
include not only the right to be heard by counsel at the trial,
but also the right to consult with counsel at every stage of
the proceeding. Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E.
773 (1919); see also Bielich v. State, 189 Ind. 127, 126 N.E.
220 (1919).
In an early case it was said the appointment of counsel
to defend persons charged with grave crimes, who are too
poor to employ counsel on their own behalf, is indispensable
to the orderly administration of justice. Hendryx v. State,
130 Ind. 265, 29 N.E. 1131 (1891); Lloyd v. State, 206 Ind.
359, 189 N.E. 406 (1933). However, it was pointed out in
Houk v. Board of Conmr's., 14 Ind. App. 662, 41 N.E. 1068
(1895) that the right of the accused to have his counsel
furnished at the expense of the public was given by statute
and not by the constitution, and that that right did not
apply to the justice court. The court may refuse to assign
to poor persons the counsel they may choose. Burton v.
State, 75 Ind. 477 (1881), but the defendant must have counsel, Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217
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Ind. 493, 29 N.E. (2d) 405 (1940); Irwin v. State, 220 Ind.
228, 41 N.E. 809 (1942).
Under the right of accused to be heard by himself, the
accused may not of his own choice appear for himself, conduct the trial for himself, cross-examine witnesses, and give
a long detailed statement of the evidence in his defense, and
then demand the right to be heard by counsel. Marovich v.
State, 202 Ind. 274, 173 N.E. 326 (1930).
5. The right to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation has been interpreted as entitling the accused to
have the gist of the offense or the material averments of
the indictment clearly stated in direct and unmistakable
terms, so as to apprise him of the nature and character of
the charge against him. Kimmel v. State, 198 Ind. 444, 154
N.E. 16 (1926); Kraft v. State, 202 Ind. 44A 171 N.E. 1
(1930). In other words, every essential element of the crime
charged must be set out in the indictment or declaration.
For example, in the crime of blackmail the intent to extort
money is one of the essential elements; and the statement
that the accused did acts with the intent to extort certain
pecuniary advantages, the exact nature of which were unknown was held insufficient under this provision. McNamara v. State, 203 Ind. 596, 181 N.E. 512 (1932); see also
Hinshaw v. State, 188 Ind. 147, 122 N.E. 418 (1918); Glendale Coal Co. v. Douglas, 193 Ind. 73, 137 N.E. 615 (1922);
State v. Brown, 208 Ind. 562, 196 N.E. 696 (1935); Shelton
v. State, 209 Ind. 534, 199 N.E. 148 (1935); Roby v. State,
215 Ind. 55, 17 N.E. (2d) 800 (1938).
6. The cases decided in Indiana on the right to confrontation of witnesses are in accord with the cases of other
jurisdictions. They recognize exceptions to this right, in
admitting testimony given by a witness on a previous trial,
as which time the defendant had the right to be confronted
by the witness, upon a showing that the witness is now dead,
insane,, or lost and diligent search has been made to find
him. Wilson v. State, 175 Ind. 458, 93 N.E. 609 (1910);
Levi v. State, 182 Ind. 104 N.E. 765 (1914); Brown v. State,
219 Ind. 251, 37 N.E. (2d) 73, 137 A.L.R. 679 (1941).
Section XIV. No person shall be put in jeopardy twice
for the same offense. No person, in any criminal prosecution,
shall be compelled to testify against himself.
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1. The early background of the provision protecting
individuals from being put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense indicates that its purpose was to prevent such oppressive occurrences as the retrial under a new government
of persons who had been acquitted of the same offense under a preceding regime. Ex Parte Bradley, 48 Ind. 548,
(1874). In the light of this purpose it would be reasonable
to hold that jeopardy attaches only when the jury returns
a verdict. However, Indiana is in accord with the federal
view in extending the protection of this provision by ruling
that jeopardy attaches whenever a person has been given in
charge to a regular jury, duly impaneled and sworn, on a
legal indictment. Gillespie v. State, 168 Ind. 298, 80 N.E.
829 (1907); see Weinzorpflin v. State, 7 Blackf. 186 (1844).
Thus, if, after the jury is impaneled and sworn, the court
allows the prosecution, over the objection of the defense,
to discharge a juror without cause, the defendants discharge
is equivalent to an acquittal. The double jeopardy provision
protects him against being placed on trial before a different
jury for the same offense. Gillespie v. State, supra; see
State v. Wilson, 50 Ind. 487 (1875).
To this broad rule, Indiana has recognized exceptions
whereby under certain circumstances proceedings may be
terminated after the jury has been sworn and defendant will
still be subject to a new prosecution for the same offense.
Thus, a juror may be excused on account of sickness; Doles
v. State, 97 Ind. 555 (1884); or the jury may be discharged
after due deliberation on account of inability to agree; State
v. Leach, 120 Ind. 124, 22 N.E. 111 (1889) ; State v. Larimore,
173 Ind. 452, 90 N.E. 898 (1909); or the judge may of his
own accord stop the trial when it appears that the indictment
is so defective as to be unable to support a conviction, see
Joy v. State, 14 Ind. 139 (1860), without giving the defendant an immunity from a later prosecution for the same offense.
Also, the immunity against double jeopardy may be
waived by the defendant in such instances as when he moves
for a new trial, or for an arrest of judgment. Ledgerwood
v. State, 134 Ind. 81, 33 N.E. 631 (1892); State v. Joy Ex
Parte Bradley, both supra. Likewise, a writ of error
coram nobis waives the defendant's immunity against double
jeopardy, if granted, even to the extent that if on the second
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prosecution defendant is again convicted, the fact that he
has already paid his fine or served his sentence will avail
him nothing. State v. Kiligrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808
(1930).
The privilege against double jeopardy applies only when
there is an attempt to prosecute a second time for the same
offense. But the fact that the defendant has been prosecuted
for one offence will not preclude his prosecution a second
time for the same actual conduct if the offense charged is
a different offense. Thus under a statute- prohibiting the
selling, bartering, or giving away of intoxicating liquor to a
person already intoxicated, acquittal on the charge of giving
away intoxicating liquor will not prevent prosecution for
selling intoxicating liquor. State v. Reed, 168 Ind. 588, 91
N.E. 571 (1907); and see Miller v. State 33 Ind. App. 509,
71 N.E. 248 (1904). It is said that the second prosecution
refers to the same offense whenever that- which is set out
in the second indictment, if proved, would have sustained a
conviction under the first prosecution. Thus, a prosecution
for transporting intoxicating liquor in an automobile, a felony by statute, is precluded by an earlier prosecution on the
general misdemeanor of unlawfully transporting intoxicating
liquor. Arrol v. State, 207 Ind. 321, 192 N.E. 440 (1934).
Double jeopardy applies only to bar a second prosecution
for the same offense in the same jurisdiction, and not to a
second prosecution for the same offense in some other jurisdiction. Thus, it is no objection to an indictment for an
offense against a state statute that the defendant is liable
to punishment for the same act under a federal law. State
v. Moore, 6 Ind. 436 (1855).'
2. The Indiana cases determining the extent of the
privilege against self-incrimination are for the most part in
accord with the federal cases construing a similar provision.
Section 14 has been held to go much farther than to prevent
an accused person from being compelled against his will to
give testimonial evidence which might establish his guilt
of the crime charged. It guarantees a person freedom from
being compelled to give evidence in any proceeding whether
civil or criminal which might be used against -him in any
criminal prosecution. French v. Venneman, 14 Ind. 282
(1860). Such a witness may refuse to make an answer
which would tend to criminate him or furnish one link in
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the chain of evidence. And although the court is authorized
to determine whether the privilege to refuse to answer exists
on each occasion, the court is bound by the statement of the
witness as to its effect, unless it clearly appears that the
witness was mistaken as to its effect, or that the witness
refusal was purely .contumacious. Overman v. State, 194
Ind. 483, 143 N.E. 607 (1924).
The privilege has been held to apply not only to examination on trial but also to pre-trial examinations by grand
juries; State v. Comer, 157 Ind. 611, 62 N.E. 452 (1902) ;
or by investigating officers, such as the State Fire Marshall.
Ogle v. State 193 Ind. 187, 127 N.E. 547 (1923) ; see Kokenes
v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E. (2d) 524 (1938).
The privilege of an accused person has been extended
in Indiana by decision and statute beyond the mere right
to refuse to answer questions. It includes a privilege not
to be called to the witness stand by court or prosecutor, and
prevents the state from commenting upon the fact that the
defendant has failed to testify in his defense, or has failed
to produce books or papers in his possession which should
have cleared him of the shadow of guilt-if he were innocent. Cassidy v. State, 201 Ind. 311, 168 N.E. 18 (1929);
Sprague v. State, 203 Ind. 581, 181 N.E. 507 (1932) ; see also
Keifer v. State, 204 Ind. 454, 184 N.E. 557 (1933).
In accordance with the federal ruling in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1885), employing both
the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments of the federal constitution in holding that papers and articles obtained by illegal searches and seizures are inadmissible in evidence, the
Indiana Court has coupled section 14 with section 11 of article 1 of the Indiana Constitution to reach the same result. Flum v. State, 193 Ind. 585, 141 N.E. 353 (1923); see
supra, section 11.
One limitation upon the privilege against self-incrimination has been plainly marked out by the Indiana cases. The
privilege exists only as to testimonial compulsion as distinguished from compulsory submission to treatment which
furnishes evidence for the purpose of identification of the
accused. Thus the admission into evidence of the results
of an examination of the accused's body, against his will,
to find certain scars and marks thereon, was held not a
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. O'Brien
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v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 N.E. 137 (1870). Nor was the use
of shoes taken from the accused by force, after his arrest,
for purposes of identification, a violation of the self-incrimination clause. Briggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200, 167 N.E. 129
(1929). Likewise, holding accused until his beard grew out
and then holding a handkerchief over the lower part of his
face to identify him as a bank robber was proper. Ross v.
State, 204 Ind. 281, 182 N.E. 865 (1932) ; and see Noelke v.
State, 214 Ind. 427, 15 N.E. (2d) 950 (1935).
The accused may, of course, waive his privilege against
self-incrimination, and when he testifies before a grand jury
without objection, he is deemed to have done so voluntarily,
although he may not have been informed of his privilege
against self-incrimination beforehand. State v. Comer, supra.
The defendant by testifying as a witness in his own behalf
waives his privilege against self-incrimination to the extent
of the bounds of legitimate cross-examination. State v.
Schopmeter, 207 Ind. 538, 194 N.E. 144 (1935). See also,
Schneider v. State, 220 Ind. 28, 40 N.E. (2d) 322 (1941);
Spitler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N.E. (2d) 591 (1942).
Since the purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination
is to permit an individual to refrain from so testifying as
to make himself liable to be criminally prosecuted, the state
may by a statute completely do away with any criminal
liability that might arise from the subject matter of his
testimony, and so do away with the privilege. However, it
was held that a witness could not be compelled to testify
under a statute which gave him immunity from prosecution
only for the crime involved in the particular case, since
this did not fully shield the witness. Overman v. State, supra.
It has also been held that the state under its police power
in regulating the use of state highways may by statute impose certain conditions upon those who use the highway
which might infringe upon their privilege against self-incrimination. A statute requiring every driver involved in
an automobile accident to stop and leave his name, address,
license number, and the certificate of registration of his
auto, was held constitutional. Ule v. State, 208 Ind. 255,
194 N.E. 140 (1935).
Section XV. No person arrested or confined in jail shall
be treated with unnecessary rigor.
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This section, although it clearly sets out a policy against
the mistreatment of prisoners, apparently affords little protection beyond what is afforded by other sections of the
constitution. Thus, while this section plainly prohibits such
methods as the "third degree" from being used to extort
confessions from suspected criminals, it apparently goes no
further than to make confessions so extorted inadmissible
as evidence, a rule which may also be based on section 14.
Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E. (2d) 524 (1938).
Section 15 has also been cited to support the rule that it is
reversible error to bring the accused to bar in irons or
shackles unless there be evident danger of escape, but because
of the prejudicial effect that such an appearance might have
on the jury, section 13, guaranteeing the right to trial by an
impartial jury also supports this rule. Hall v. State, 199
Ind. 592, 159 N.E. 420 (1928). However it may be said that
section 15, in setting out a strong policy against cruelty and
violence to prisoners, should give support to the civil or
criminal proceedings brought against the offending officers.
Bonahoon v. State, 203 Ind. 51, 178 N.E. 570 (1931).
Section XVI. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive
fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments
shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to
the nature of the offenses.
1. This section seems to set out general limitations on
the severity of various criminal sanctions, but Indiana cases
definitely interpreting this section are scarce. The meaning
of the word "excessive" as applied to bail and fine has not
been concretely defined by the cases. But with respect to
bail, the general rule suggested under the similar provision
in the federal constitution-that the amount is not excessive
as long as, upon considering the seriousness of the offense,
the probability of guilt, and the prisoner's pecuniary circumstances, no more is required than will secure the party's
attendance (Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 559)-is probably
followed in Indiana.
2. The early Indiana cases which involved the question as to whether or not a "cruel and unusual" punishment
had been inflicted indicated a tendency to construe this
provision very narrowly. When a sentence or fine was attacked which had been set within the limits set out by statute,
the rule was stated that no matter how harsh and severe the
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punishment seemed, the only remedy the accused had under
this provision was to attack the constitutionality of the statute. Shields v. State, 149 Ind. 395, 49 N.E. 351 (1884);
Miller v. State, 149 Ind. 607, 49 N.E. 894 (1898). And
when the statute was attacked as prescribing excessive punishment, the early cases indicated that this provision was
aimed at the form and character of the punishment rather
than its severity in respect to term of imprisonment or
amount of fine. Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 32 N.E. 1019
(1892) ; Kistler v. State, 190 Ind. 149, 129 N.E. 625 (1921);
McCutcheon v. State, 199 Ind. 247, 155 N.E. 544 (1927).
But apparently both of these rules have been reversed
by the more recent case of Cox v. State, 203 Ind. 544, 181
N.E. 469 (1932). In this case the court declared that the
fact that a statute provided punishment, the degree or amount
of which was excessive or unreasonable, would be sufficient
grounds for declaring it unconstitutional, and also that the
court should be free to give relief against a cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted under a valid statute where the courts
have abused their discretion in fixing the amount of punishment. Under this case Section 16 has become a more potential force in protecting the rights of accused persons.
3. The meaning of the statement that all penalties shall
be proportioned to the nature of the offenses is quite clear,
but the strictness with which the phrase should be applied
has not been settled by the Indiana cases. However it has
been held that statutes which fail to prescribe the maximum
penalty to be awarded upon perpetration of a wrongful act
do not violate this provision. Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Ferguson, 157 Ind. 37, 60 N.E. 679 (1901); Sweigart v.
State, 213 Ind. 157, 12 N.E. (2d) 134 (1938). In the latter
case it was said that even where no maximum penalty is
imposed by statute, the power to impose a fine is limited by
the provision that "excessive fines shall not be imposed."
Section XVII. Offenses, other than murder or treason,
shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. Murder or treason shall
not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the presumption
strong.

In determining when the right to bail exists in murder
and treason cases, it is well settled in Indiana that upon a
charge of murder the indictment stands as prima facie evidence that the defendant has no right to bail, and that the
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burden is on the defendant to show that the iroof of guilt
is not evident or that the presumption of guilt is not strong.
Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind. 87 (1866) ; Ex parte Jones, 55 Ind.
176 (1876). In introducing evidence to sustain his burden
of proof the accused is required to introduce the evidence
of witnesses indicated by the indictment, and also of such
witnesses as the State shall indicate that it relies on; but
he may also introduce other witnesses, whom the state does
not rely upon. State v. Hedges, 177 Ind. 589, 98 N.E. 417
(1912); McAdams v. State, 196 Ind. 184, 147 N.E. 764
(1925).
The immunity against imprisonment without bail exists only before the case has come to trial. After the trial,
release on bail may be obtained pending appeal, not under
the constitutional immunity, but rather, as a matter of grace
afforded by the legislature under particular conditions. Ex
parte Pettiford, 97 Ind. App. 703, 167 N.E. 154 (1929).
Section XVIII. The penal code shall be founded on the
principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.

This section has several times been the basis of an
attack upon the validity of a criminal statute providing somewhat stringent punishment, but since on none of these occasions did the court see fit to hold this section violated,
there has been no occasion requiring a judicial clarification
of its rather indefinite terms. Thus, it was held that statutes providing the death penalty for the crime of murder
was not vindictive punishment under this section. Rice v.
State, 7 Ind. 332 (1855) ; Driskell v. State, 7 Ind. 338 (1855) ;
McCutcheon v. State, 199 Ind. 247, 155 N.E. 544 (1927).
Nor did the statute providing imprisonment for from one
to three years and disfranchisement of three years for desertion of wife or children violate this section. Kistler v.
State, 190 Ind. 149, 129 N.E. 625 (1921). Driskell v. State,
supra, interprets this section as requiring the penal laws
to be so framed as to protect society, and at the same time,
as a system, to inculcate the principle of reform. Under
this interpretation it is doubtful whether this section will
exercise anything more than the power of persuasion over
penal legislation.
Section XIX. In all criminal cases whatever, the jury
shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.
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Under the clear meaning of section 19 extending the
function of the jury to determining both law and facts in
criminal trials, the question is raised as to what part is
left for the courts to play in criminal trials. It has been
held that the enlarged function of the jury does not extend
beyond the trial of the issues of the case. It is still within
the province of the court to determine the sufficiency of
an indictment; Daily v. State, 10 Ind. 536 (185) ; and the
jury does not have a constitutional right to fix the punishment of the defendant. Skelton v. State, 149 Ind. 641, 49
N.E. 901 (1898).
As for the relative functions of the court and jury during
a criminal trial, much light is thrown by the cases involving
the correctness of instructions given by the court to the jury.
With respect to the right of the jury to determine questions
of fact, it has been held error for the court to instruct the
jury as to the inferences of fact that may be drawn from
a particular set of facts, this being an invasion of the province of the jury. Burrows v. State, 137 Ind. 474, 37 N.E.
271 (1893); McHargue v. State, 193 Ind. 204, 139 N.E.
316 (1923); McNulty v. State, 40 Ind. App. 113, 81 N.E. 109
(1907).
With respect to the right of the jury to determine questions of law, it has been held that while the court must in
criminal cases charge as to all matters of law which are
necessary for their information in giving their verdict, yet
these instructions are advisory only. The jury has the right
under the constitution to determine the law as applicable to
the case at hand. McDonald v. State, 63 Ind. 544 (1878). It
was held error for the court to instruct the jury, "you are the
exclusive judges of the evidence, and may determine the law;
but it is as much your duty to believe the law to be as
charged to you by the Court, as it is your sworn duty to
determine the evidence." Williams v. Steele, 10 Ind. 503
(1858).
On the other hand, to instruct the jury that it
had the right to reject the court's instructions and to construe the law for itself, but notwithstanding the right to
disagree with the court as to what the law is, "you should
weigh the instructions given you in the case as you weigh
the evidence, and disregard neither without proper reason,"
was held proper. Blaker v. State, 130 Ind. 203, 29 N.E.
1077 (1891).
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It has also been held proper to instruct the jury that
while they have the right to determine the law, it is their
duty to administer the law as they find it to be, and that
they are not at liberty to set aside the law and disregard
it for any reason. Cunacoff v. State, 193 Ind. 62, 138 N.E.
690 (1923) ; see also Hoffa v. State, 194 Ind. 300, 142 N.E.
653 (1924); Burris v. State, 218 Ind. 601, 34 N.E. (2nd)
928 (1941).
From these instructions it would appear that the jury in
determining the law of the case must choose between following the instructions of the court or relying upon its own
knowledge of the legal aspects of the case. Although it
has been held error for the court to instruct the jury that
before it may disregard the instructions of the court it
should "reflect whether from their study and experience,
they are better qualified to judge the law than the court;"
Schuster v. State, 178 Ind. 320, 99 N.E. 422 (1912); Redrick v. State, 210 Ind. 259, 2 N.E. (2d) 409 (1936) ; it would
seem that the ordinary jury would of its own accord take
this into consideration in making the choice. Thus, the
strong influence which the court's advisory instructions would
ordinarily have on the determination of questions of law is
quite evident.
Section XX. In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate.

In general the Indiana cases on this section are in accord
with other jurisdictions interpreting similar sections, restricting its application to that group of civil cases in which
the right to jury trial was recognized at the time this section
was first adopted. Thus it has been held that no constitutional privilege of jury trial exists in chancery proceedings,
nor in newly created statutory proceedings, nor in extraordinary legal proceedings in which the right to jury trial was
not recognized before the adoption of section 20.
In particular, the privilege of jury trial has been held
not to exist in such chancery proceedings as divorce suits;
Lewis v. Lewis, 9 Ind. 105 (1857); suits to obtain relief
from fraud; Israel v. Jackson, 93 Ind. 543 (1883); injunction suits; Helm v. First National Bank, 91 Ind. 44 (1883) ;
suits to foreclose and suits to cancel mortgages; Carmichael
v. Adams, 91 Ind. 526 (1883) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 115 Ind.
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112, 17 N.E. 111 (1888); or proceedings to establish a lost
will. Wright v. Fultz, 138 Ind. 594, 38 N.E. 175 (1894).
Likewise this section was held not to guarantee the right
to jury trial in such a statutory proceeding as an appeal from
a decision of a board of public works ruling on special assessments against property for public improvements. Crown
Point v. Newcomber, 204 Ind. 589, 185 N.E. 440 (1933).
With respect to extraordinary legal proceedings, it has
been held that no privilege of jury trial exists in a writ of
habeas corpus proceedings. Baker v. Gordon, 23 Ind. 204
(1864). But in mandamus and quo warranto proceedings
the privilege of jury trial has been held to exist. State ex
rel McCalla v. Burnsville Turnpike Co., 97 Ind. 416 (1884);
Reynolds v. State ex rel Titus, 61 Ind. 392 (1878). However, the holdings of both of these latter cases probably rest
more upon statutes giving this right, than upon the constitutional guaranty . See also Kelly v. Herbst, 202 Ind. 55,
170 N.E. 853 (1930).
Since eminent domain proceedings are more similar to
extraordinary legal proceedings or special statutory proceedings than to the ordinary common law legal actions it would
be expected that no privilege of jury trial would exist therein. Yet the early case of Lake Erie, W. etc. R. Co. v. Heath,
9 Ind. 558 (1857), held that a land owner had the right to
have the value of his land, taken by a railroad company as
a right of way, determined by jury trial, since the past
practice had been to provide jury trial on such cases. It
was said that such a case was a "civil case" within the meaning of the constitution. However, shortly thereafter a statute authorizing the supervisor to enter upon land, construct
ditches, remove gravel, or cut down trees for the construc*tion or repair of a highway was upheld as constitutional,
although the damages were to be assessed by three appraisers rather than by jury trial. Droneberger v. Reed, 11 Ind.
420 (1858). Similarly, a statute providing that questions
of fact arising out of drainage ditch proceedings shall be
decided by a court without a jury, was held not to conflict
with the above provision. Anderson v. Caldwell, 91 Ind.
451 (1883). Thus, except when particular proceedings are
involved in which the past policy has been to try issues of
fact by jury, it would seem that eminent domain proceedings
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are not among those civil cases in which the privilege of
jury trial is guaranteed.
On the other hand, the privilege of jury trial has been
held to exist not only in recognized common law legal proceedings, including suits to recover on a guardian's bond,
and bastardy proceedings; Galway v. State ex rel Ballow, 93
Ind. 161 (1883) ; Alley v. State 76 Ind. 94 (1881) ; but also
in proceedings which at common law could have been either
legal or equitable, such as actions between sureties for contribution, and suits to partition real estate. Sanders v. Weilburg, 107 Ind. 266 (1886); Michael v. Albright, 126 Ind.
172, 25 N.E. 902 (1890); Kitts v. Willson, 106 Ind. 147,
5 N.E. 400 (1885).
It was even held that a privilege of
jury trial existed in a statutory proceeding to quiet title because the proceeding was not only founded upon principles
of equity but was also intended as a substitute for the old
action of ejectment. Trittipo v. Morgan, 99 Ind. 269 (1884).
The idea that the privilege of jury trial shall remain
unchanged as it was at common law has affected not only
the types of cases to which the provision is applied but also
certain features of the jury trial itself. Thus the Indiana
courts have recognized as essential such common law features as the requirements (1) that the jury be comprised
of twelve men; Millers National Insurance Co. v. American
National Bank, 206 Ind. 511, 190 N.E. 433 (1934); (2)
that the jury be presided over by a judge with power to
direct the conduct of the trial, advise the jury according to
law, and arrest and set aside judgment; see New York C.
etc. R. Co. v. Callahan, 40 Ind. App. 223, 81 N.E. 670 (1907) ;
Lyons v. New Albany, 54 Ind. App. 416, 103 N.E. 20 (1913) ;
(3) and that the verdict of the jury be unanimous. W. T.
Rawleigh v. Snider, 207 Ind. 686, 194 N.E. 356 (1935) ; Schembri v. Shearer, 208 Ind. 97, 194 N.E. 615 (1935) ; Ewing v.
Duncan, 209 Ind. 33, 197 N.E. 901 (1935); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Harvey, 209 Ind. 262, 198 N.E. 782 (1935).
On the other hand, with respect to the qualifications of
jurors it has been held that the common law requirements
need not be followed. The qualifications of the jurors are
under legislative control, subject to the constitutional requirement of impartiality. Thus there is no constitutional
violation in appointing under certain circumstances a special
jury from bystanders, rather than from the legular panel;
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Albany Land Co. v. Rickel, 162 Ind. 222, 70 N.E. 158 (1904) ;
or in allowing women to sit on the jury; Palmer v. State,
197 Ind. 625, 150 N.E. 917 (1926) ; or in requiring that jurymen in a city court be qualified voters of the city. Millers
National Insurance Co. v. American State Bank, supra. Concerning trial by jury and directed verdicts, see Mich. Cent.
Ry. Co. v. Spindler, 211 Ind. 94, 5 N.E. (2d) 632 (1936);
Kettner v. Jay, 107 Ind. App. 643, 26 N.E. (2d) 546 (1939).
From these cases it would appear that while the court
has applied the rule that jury trial must remain as it was at
common law in order to restrict the application of section
20 as much as possible, and to prevent some perhaps unwise
changes towards making it easier to obtain a verdict, the
court has wisely refrained from applying this rule as to the
qualification of the jurors, so that the legislature will be
free to take steps to improve the quality of the jury.
Section XXI. No man's particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation. No man's property shall
be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in
case of the State, without such compensation first assessed
and tendered.

1. The main problem arising under the requirement
that no man's particular services shall be demanded without
just compensation is to determine the meaning of "particular
services." It has been held that there are certain services
which an individual owes to his government for which he
can demand no compensation. These services have been said
to include responding to the supervisor's summons to labor
on the highway, serving on the sheriff's posse comitatis
when commanded to do so, see Washington National Bank
v. Daily, 166 Ind. 631, 77 N.E. 53 (1906), and more important at the present time, acting as a witness on a criminal
trial when the individual has knowledge of facts having a
bearing on the issues of the case. Israel v. State, 8 Ind. 467
(1857).
On the other hand it has been held that the opinions of
an "expert" witness, such as those of a physician or a surgeon may not be required as testimony at a criminal trial
without payment of just compensation. Buchman v. State,
59 Ind. 1 (1877). To so testify would be to render a "particular" service, since such testimony would be based upon
the witness's accomplishments, which may be valuable to
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him as a source of livelihood, rather than based upon knowledge of some fact which is pertinent only to the particular
case.
It has also been held that an attorney's services are
"particular" services and to refuse to defend a poor man
when no compensation is provided is not contempt of court.
Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853). There is some question
as to whether the state is under a duty to make adequate
provision for compensating attorneys appointed to defend
indigent persons in criminal trials, in order to carry out the
guaranty of the right to be heard by counsel, provided for
by section 13, supra. However, since no case has arisen in
which a poor man has been forced to stand trial without
counsel because inadequate provision has been made by the
state to compensate counsel, this question has not been settled. But see, Knight v. Board of Commissioners, 179 Ind.
568, 101 N.E. 1010 (1913) ; Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854) ;
Board of Commissioners v. McGregor, 171 Ind. 634, 87 N.E.
1 (1909); Board of Commissioners v. Moore, 93 Ind. App.
180, 166 N.E. 779 (1931).
It has been held that the legislature may require those
dealing in gasoline to make returns of the amount of gasoline sold and to collect and pay the tax levied thereon without compensation. No particular services are taken within
the meaning of section 21, since it is purely optional with
the gasoline dealer whether or not he carries on this particular business with its added burdens. Gafill v. Bracken,
195 Ind. 551, 145 N.E. 312, 146 N.E. 109 (1925). The same
reasoning has been applied to sustain the changing by the
legislature of the duties of public officers without also changing their compensation. Turpen v. Board of Commissioners,
7 Ind. 172 (1855) ; Falkenburgh v. Jones, 5 Ind. 296 (1854).
2. The Indiana cases are in confusion as to whether
the provision that no man's property shall be taken without
just compensation should be construed as broadly as the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
constitution, or whether it should be limited to prohibiting
the taking of property by eminent domain without compensation. The earlier cases seem to have followed the former
construction, one case holding that the section protected not
only real property and tangible chattels but also intangible
property, as to prevent a defense to a cause of action from

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20

being taken away without just compensation. Baltimore and
Ohio Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Reed, 158 Ind. 25, 62 N.E.
488 (1902); and see Evansville and Crawfordsville Ry. Co.
v. Dick, 9 Ind. 433 (1857) ; Parke County Coal Co. v. Campbell, 140 Ind. 28, 39 N.E. 149 (1894).
However it was stated in a later case that section 21
can be properly applied only to the taking of specific property to be devoted to a public or quasi-public use under the
power of eminent domain. Harmon v. Bolley, 187 Ind. 511,
120 N.E. 33 (1918). This case apparently held that section
21 did not require special assessments, to pay for certain
public improvements, to be determined in proportion to the
benefits conferred upon land assessed. See Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 19 Sup. Ct. 187 (1898); of. Hutchins v.
Town of Freemont, 194 Ind. 74, 142 N.E. 3 (1923).
Since this decision section 21 has often been raised to
attack actions of the state involving other than eminent domain proceedings on the grounds that property is being taken
without just compensation. However since in these cases
the action of the state was upheld under its police power, it
was not clear whether or not section 21 would otherwise
have governed such situations. See Indian Refining Co. v.
Taylor, 195 Ind. 223, 143 N.E. 682 (1924).1 °
11.

Included among the various types of statutory classifications
which have been held valid by the Indiana courts are classifications according to occupation and classifications according to
geographical distinctions. A close case upholding a classification
according to occupation involved a statute making an exception
to Sunday laws by allowing baseball to be played on Sunday.
Carr v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N.E. 1071 (1910).
(See the dissenting opinion by Chief of Justice Myers. 175 Ind. 264, 93 N.E.
1079). See also Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak, 172 Ind. 423, 87
N.E. 229 (1909); Ayres v. State, 178 Ind. 453, 99 N.E. 730 (1912);
Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co., 187 Ind. 623, 120 N.E. 19
(1918); School City of Elwood v. State ex rel, 203 Ind. 626, 180
N.E. 471 (1932); Rateliff v. Dick Johnson School Twp., 204 Ind.
525, 185 N.E. 143 (1933); Kostanzer v. State ex rel Ramsey, 205
Ind. 536, 187 N.E. 337 (1933); With respect to the geographical
distinction, a statute allowing a person between the ages of 14
and 16 years to obtain a permit to drive an automobile to and
from school, provided he did not live in a city of the first or
second class, was upheld. Shedd v. Automobile Ins. Co., 208 Ind.
621, 196 N.E. 227 (1935). See also, Klipsch v. Indiana Alcoholic
Beverage Comm., 215 Ind. 616, 21 N.E. (2d) 701 (1939); Bennett v. Indiana State Board etc. of Optometry, 211 Ind. 678, 7
N.E. (2d) 977 (1936); Geslot v. Swartz, 212 Ind. 292, 7 N.E. (2d)
960 (1937).
For purposes of taxation various classifications of items
of personal property have been upheld. Thus, classifications distinguishing intangible property from tangible property, Lutz v.

19451

THE INDIANA BILL OF RIGHTS

Sometimes the validity of a tax has been attacked under
section 21. However, in such cases it has been stated that
section 21 prohibits only the taking, without compensation,
of specific pieces of property of an individual by virtue of
the right of eminent domain. Under the taxing power private property may be taken for public use without any compensation other than the common benefit which the appropriation and expenditures of the proceeds of the tax produce.
City of Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74 (1857) ; Board of Commissioners v. State ex rel Brown, 147 Ind. 476 (1897); State
ex rel v. Steinwedel, 203 Ind. 457, 180 N.E. 865 (1932).
Although the extent to which section 21 may be applied beyond eminent domain proceedings is riot clearly defined by the Indiana cases, there is no doubt that it places
definite limitations on the right of the state to allow property
to be taken by eminent domain. In the first place property
taken under the power of eminent domain must be taken for
public purpose, and not for mere private use. Wild v. Deig,
43 Ind. 455 (1873) ; Stewart v. Hartman, 46 Ind. 331 (1874) ;
see Lohan v. Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372, 24 N.E. 135 (1889).
And whether a particular use is a public or private use
is a judicial question to be determined by the courts. Sexauer
v. Star Milling Co., 173 Ind. 342, 90 N.E. 474 (1909).
The line between public and private use has not been
clearly drawn in Indiana. In holding that a Chautauqua Company was not of such "public use" as to warrant the deleArnold, 208 Ind. 480, 193 N.E. 840 (1935), large gross incomes
from smaller gross incomes, Miles v. Department of Treasury,
209 Ind. 172, 199 N.E. 372 (1935), and trucks used for hire from
trucks not used for hire, Kelly v. Finney, 207 Ind. 557, 194 N.E.
157 (1935), have all been upheld.
But while a "Chain Store" tax, which was graduated according to the number of stores operated under a single ownership, was upheld in the federal courts as being a proper classification for revenue purposes, State Boardof Tax Commissioners
v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. "540 (1931), its clas-sification was sustained by the Indiana court in a later case on other
grounds. It was held a proper exercise of the police poiver to
discourage enterprises having monopolistic tendencies. Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 206
Ind. 688, 187 N.E. 882 (1934).
The provision may not be restricted in its application to
special privileges and communities growing out of the election of
public officers, for its protection extends to every relationship
which may be the subject of legislative enactment. Harrell v.
Sullivan, 220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E. (2d) 115, 41 N.E. (2d) 354 (1941)
overruling Blue v. State, ex rel Brown, 206 Ind. 98, 188 Ind.
583 (1933).
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gation of the power of eminent domain, the Indiana Court
stated that, "it seems to be well settled in Indiana that it is
essential to constitute a public use that the general public
have the right to a definite and fixed use of the property appropriated not as a mere favor or by permission of the owner,
but as a matter of right." Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler,
199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927); see Westport Stone Co.
v. Thomas, 175 Ind. 319, 94 N.E. 406 (1911). However, a
more recent case seems to have taken the broader view of the
meaning of "public use". It sustained the validity of a
statute granting to limestone quarries the power of eminent
domain to construct lateral railroads over any private lands
intervening between the quarries and the main railroad lines.
The facts that quarrying is vitally connected with the public
policy of developing natural resources, and that its development is of great importance to the state and community in
which it is located were given as reasons for the decision.
Indianapolis Oolitic Stone Co. v. King Stone Co., 206 Ind.
412, 190 N.E. 57 (1934).
In the second place just compensation must be given.
The determination of what is "just compensation" has been
left largely to the discretion of the legislature. Thus, in
determining the damages caused by the condemnation of
certain lands of an individual, the early Indiana cases held
that the benefits actually and substantially accruing to the
individual in consequence of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain over his property may be properly deducted.
Rassier v. Grimmer, 130 Ind. 219, 28 N.E. 866, 29 N.E. 918
(1891); Forsythe v. Wilcox, 143 Ind. 144, 41 N.E. 371
(1895); Heath v. Sheetz, 164 Ind. 665, 74 N.E. 505 (1905).
But under a later statute the cases held that to preclude the
consideration of such benefits is likewise a proper and valid
method of determining "just compensation." State v. Reid,
204 Ind. 631, 185 N.E. 449 (1933). See also, McNutt v.
Orcutt, 211 Ind. 523, 199 N.E. 595, 7 N.E. (2d) 779 (1936).
Lastly, it has been held that the requirement that due
compensation must first be assessed and tendered before
anyone other than the state may take property by eminent
domain is satisfied when the condemning party pays the
assessed damages into court. However, when the condemning party intends to appeal from such assessment he cannot
be authorized under section 21 to have the money so paid
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to the court withheld from the property owner and at the
same time take possession of the property. Consumers Gas
Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 26 N.E. 1062 (1891).
Section XXII. The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the
necessary comforts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome
laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure
or sale for the payment of any debt, or liability, hereafter contracted; and there shall be no imprisonment for debt, except
in case of fraud.

1. The first part of this provision is directory only,
leaving no doubt as to the constitutionality of debtors' exemption statutes enacted in accordance with its direction,
but involving in and of itself no specific guaranties of individual rights. See Green v. Aker, 11 Ind. 223 (1858) ; Moss
v. Jenkins, 146 Ind. 589, 45 N.E. 789 (1897) Beard v. Indianapolis Fancy Grocery Co., 180 Ind. 536, 103 N.E. 404
(1913). By virtue of this section a number of statutes have
been passed exempting from liability for debts a certain
amount of a debtor's property. See Burns Anno. Stat. (1933)
Supp. sec. 2-3501. This section has also been employed in
maintaining the validity of similar statutes, such as a statute
prohibiting the evasion of the Indiana debtors' exemption
statute by assigning a claim against a resident of Indiana
for the purpose of having the claim collected by garnishment
outside of the state; Markley v. Murphy, 180 Ind. 4, 102
N.E. 376 (1913); and a statute prohibiting the assignment
of a claim for wages by a married man without the consent
of his wife. Cleveland, C.C. etc. Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 182
Ind. 280, 105 N.E. 570 (1914).
2. With respect to the latter part of Section 22, apparently the debts referred to are only those arising in the
ordinary civil transactions. It has been held by Indiana
cases that the penalty accruing from a breach of a city ordinance is not a debt within the meaning of this section.
Hardenbrook v. Ligonier, 95 Ind. 70 (1883); see State ex rel
v. Schoonover, 135 Ind. 526, 35 N.E. 119 (1905). Nor is it
a violation df section 22 to imprison a person for contempt of
court upon failing to pay a decree for the support of his
wife. Perry v. Pernet, 165 Ind. 67, 74 N.E. 609 (1905). A
statute providing for garnishment of not to exceed ten per
cent of a debtor's wages was held not in conflict with this

254

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol; 20

section. Martin v. Loula, 208 Ind. 346, 194 N.E. 178, 195
N.E. 881 (1935).
As to the type of fraud which is referred to by this
provision, it would appear that fraud in contracting as welf
as fraud in avoiding payment of debt would warrant imprisonment for debt. See Clarke v. State, 171 Ind. 104, 84
N.E. 984 (1908) ; Baker v. State ex rel, 109 Ind. 47, 9 N.E.
711 (1886); cf. State v. Ensley, 177 Ind. 483, 97 N.E. 113
(1911).
Section XXIII.

The General Assembly shall not grant

to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges and immunities

which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens.

Although in some cases section 23 has been compared
with the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal constitution, Hammer v. State,
173 Ind. 199, 206, 89 N.E. 850 (1909), upon consideration of
a number of the cases in which the question of the validity
of a statute under section 23 was raised, it becomes clear
that the general view of the Indiana cases is that section 23
serves much the same purpose as the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus in an Indiana case
the requirements of reasonable classification under the Fourteenth Amendment were laid down as follows: The legislation making the classification, "must not only operate equally upon all within the class, but the classification must furnish a reason for and justify the making of the class; that
is, the reason for the classification must inhere in the subject-matter, and rest upon some reason which is natural and
substantial, and not artificial. Not only must the classification treat all brought under its influences alike, under the
same conditions, but it must embrace all within the class
to which it is naturally related." Bedford Quarries Co. v.
Baugh, 168 Ind. 671, 674, 80 N.E. 529 (1907).
(Cited by
Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Westby, (C.C.A. 8th, 1910)
178 Fed. 619, 628.) The same doctrine has since been followed in a number of Indiana cases interpreting section 23
of the Indiana Bill of Rights. Indianapolis Traction and Terminal Co. v. Kinney, 171 Ind. 612, 85 N.E. 954 (1908) ; Carr
v. State, 175 Ind. 241, 93 N.E. 1071 (1911) dissent; HirthKrause Co. v. Cohen, 177 Ind. 1, 97 N.E. 1 (1912); Jordanv. City of Logansport, 178 Ind. 629, 99 N.E. 1060 (1912);
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Cleveland C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Schuler, 182 Ind. 57, 105
N.E. 567 (1914); Kelly v. Finney, 207 Ind. 557, 194 N.E. 157
(1934); Bolivar Township Board of Finance v. Hawkins, 207
Ind. 171, 191 N.E. 158 (1934) ; Kryder v. State. 214 Ind. 419,
15 N.E. (2d) 386 (1938) ; Eavey Co. v. Department of Treasury, 216 Ind. 255, 24 N.E. (2d) 268 (1939).
The statutory classifications which the Indiana courts
have held invalid as being unreasonable under this doctrine include: A statute fixing minimum wages to be paid to unskilled labor employed on any public work of the statebecause the skilled mechanic was excluded from the class;
Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co., 160 Ind. 338, 66 N.E.
895 (1902) ; a statute creating a preference in favor of "manual and mechanical" workers in recovering wages due from
an insolvent employer-because there was nothing inherent
in this group which should give them preference over the
other types of wage earners for the same employer; McErlain v. Taylor, 207 Ind. 240, 192 N.E. 260 (1934) ; a statute
releasing contractors from their contracts to build roads,
which contracts had been authorized by a particular statute
-because the contractors under contracts to build roads under other statutes were not similarly released. Davis Construction Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 192 Ind. 144, 132
N.E. 629 (1921). See also State v. Wiggan 187 Ind. 159,
118 N.E. 684 (1918); Sperry-Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188
Ind. 173, 122 N.E. 584 (1918). 11
It should be noted that while the equal protection clause
refers to "persons," section 23 is confined by its terms to
"citizens." In spite of this, section 23 has often been coupled with the equal protection clause in attacking the validity of a statute on the grounds that it discriminates between corporations; Tower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial Board
of Indiana, 255 U.S. 144, (1921); Indianapolis Traction and
Terminal Co. v. Kinney, 171 Ind. 612 (1908); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Schuler,
182 Ind. 57, (1914) ; and it has been said that,
"Railroad corporations are persons within the meaning of
this provision of our bill of rights, and the equality clause
of the Constitution of the United States." Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Montgomery, 152
Ind. 1, 8, 49 N.E. 582 (1898). However, it is significant to
note that in the recent case of Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler,
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199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465 (1927), in which a narrow class
of Chautauqua companies was given the power of eminent
domain to the exclusion of other Chautauqua companies
similarly situated, the opinion that the statute was invalid
class legislation was grounded solely on the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal constitution, although it was contended that section 24 was also violated. It is difficult to
see how the word "citizen" can be interpreted to include corporations.
Section XXIV. No ex post facto law, or law impairing
the obligation of contract shall ever be passed.

The provision prohibiting ex post facto laws and laws
impairing the obligation of contracts is a very common constitutional provision. In the federal constitution the same
disability is placed on not only Congress (Article I section 9)
but also the legislative body of every state (Article I section
10), so these rights of the individuals with respect to action
by the legislature of Indiana are doubly protected.
1. The Indiana decisions, in defining an ex post facto
law are in accord with the federal rule. Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 516. Such a law is one relating to criminal
matters, Andrews v. Russell, 7 Blackf. 474 (1845), retroactive in operation, altering the situation of the accused to
his disadvantage or depriving him of some lawful protection
to which he was entitled. In re Petition to Transfer Appeals, 202 Ind. 365, 174 N.E. 812 (1931). Thus, a statute
making unlawful an act which was lawful when committed,
cf. Schwomeyer v. State, 193 Ind. 99, 138 N.E. 823, (1923),
or adding to the punishment for an act, Dinkerlocker v.
Marsh, 75 Ind. 548 (1881), or increasing the malignity of
a crime, or changing the rules of evidence so as to render
a conviction more easy would violate this section. See Strong
v. State, 1 Blackf. 193 (1822).
On the other hand, matters of procedure or practice in
criminal actions may be changed so long as they do not
deprive the accused of any substantial protection; Robinson
v. State, 84 Ind. 452 (1882); In re Petition to Transfer Appeals, supra; and it has been held that the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is not invalid as being an ex post facto law,
since the act as a whole mitigates the severity of the punishment rather than increasing it. Davis v. State, 152 Ind.
34, 51 N.E. 928 (1898) ; see Strong v. State, supra.
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2. The Indiana cases under the impairment of contracts clause also seem to be in accord with the federal cases
interpreting a similar clause in the federal constitution. See
Willis, Constitutional Law pp. 599 et seq. It would appear
that the clause applies as well to executed contracts, such
as grants of land by the state, State v. Springfield Twp., 6
Ind. 83 (1854), as to executory contracts. See State Bank
v. State, 1 Blackf. 267 (1823). Also, there seems to be no
question that this clause applies to both contracts between
private individuals alone and contracts between private individuals and the state or agents of the state. However the
section does not invalidate legislation which impairs the latter type of contract as long as the detriment is suffered only
by the state or its agent. Thus, a statute releasing from
liability sureties on public depository bonds securing funds
raised by general taxation in the political subdivision depositing them was upheld. Bolivar Township Board of Finance
v. Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 191 N.E. 158 (1934). Cf McClelland
v. State, 138 Ind. 321, 37 N.E. 1089 (1891) ; Johnson v. Board
of Commissioners, 140 Ind. 152, 39 N.E. 311 (1895); Miller
v. Jackson Twp., 178 Ind. 503, 99 N.E. 102 (1912). See also
Washington v. Public Service Comm., 190 Ind. 105, 129 N.E.
401 (1921). Cf. Greensburg Water Co. v. Lewis, 189 Ind.
439, 128 N.E. 103 (1920).
It has been said that this section applies not only to
statutes doing away with an obligation of contract but also
statutes which substantially postpone, obstruct, or retard the
enforcement of a contract or lessen its value. Indianapolis
Such a
v. Robinson, 186 Ind. 660, 117 N.E. 861 (1917).
statutory change in the obligation on a public improvement
bond as to allow bondholders to present them in payment
of the public improvement assessments against their land,
when by the initial contract each bond was to. be secured
by the aggregate amount of such assessments, was held
an impairment of contract. Conter v. State, ex rel, 211 Ind.
659, 8 N.E. (2d) 75 (1937). See also Scobey v. Gibson, 17
Ind. 572 (1861); Johnson v. Gebhauer, 159 Ind. 271, 64 N.E.
855 (1902).
On the other hand, some statutory changes in the remedy for enforcing an existing contract have been held not
to be an impairment of contract, as a statute abolishing imprisonment for debt which releases persons then imprisoned
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on civil process; Fisher v. Lacky, 6 Blackf. 378 (1843); and
a statute reducing the time of notice necessary before sales
for non-payment of principal or interest on certain existing
loans secured by mortgage. Webb v. Moore, 25 Ind. 4 (1865).
See also Ralston v. Lothian, 18 Ind. 803 (1862); Jackson Hill
Coal and Coke Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 181 Ind. 385,
104 N.E. 497 (1914). See, Heath v. Fennig, 219 Ind. 629
40 N.E. (2d) 329 (1941); County Department of Public Welfare v. Pottoff, 220 Ind. 574, 44 N.E. (2d) 494 (1942).
Unlike the ex post facto law clause but in accordance
with the federal view with respect to impairment of contracts, the guaranty against impairment of contracts is not
an absolute guaranty, but is subject to certain exercises of
the police power of the state. See Pittsburg, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Chappell, 183 Ind. 141, 106
N.E. 403 (1914); Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis
Ry. Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 183 Ind. 355, 108 N.E. 525
(1915); Indianapolis v. Ryan, 212 Ind. 447, 7 N.E. (2d) 974
(1937) ; Finerty v. State ex rel. School City of Gary, 213 Ind.
470, 12 N.E. (2d) 941 (1937). The Gross Income Tax Act
taxing interest on municipal bonds does not impair the obligation of contracts, Storen v. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co., 212
Ind. 343, 7 N.E. (2d) 941, 304 U.S. 307 (1937).
Section XXV. No law shall be passed, the taking effect of
which shall be made to depend upon any authority, except as
provided in this constitution.

Although this provision is classified as a part of the
Indiana Bill of Rights it is doubtful that it should be included in this discussion since it is hardly designed for the
purpose of protecting the rights of the individual. Instead,
its effect in preventing the delegation of legislative powers
indicates a limitation on the rights of the individual insofar
as the exercise of legislative powers are concerned. For
this section has not only prevented the delegation of legislative powers to individuals such as the governor; State ex
rel v. Grant Superior Ct., 202 Ind. 197, 172 N.E. 897 (1930);
but also the redelegation of legislative power back to the
people themselves. Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853).
Section XXVI. The operation of the laws 'shall never
be suspended, except by the authority of the General Assembly.
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There has been little occasion for the courts of Indiana
to discuss the effect of this provision, and since, like section
25, it would seem to protect the powers of the legislature
rather than the rights and privileges of the individual, it
can well be omitted from a discussion of the Bill of Rights
of Indiana.
Section XXVII. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except in the case of rebellion or
invasion; and then, only if the public safety demand it.

There is some doubt, under sections similar to the instant section, as to whether the power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus lies in the executive or the legislature.
Apparently the federal view is that Congress alone possesses
this power. Ex Parte Merriman (161), Taney 246 (Fed.
Cas. No. 9487). Likewise according to dicta in an Indiana
case, "The suspension of the writ from our State Court must
come from the State Legislature." This conclusion was based,
to some extent, on section 26 of the Indiana Bill of Rights,
which gives the General Assembly the exclusive power to
authorize the suspension of laws. Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind.
370 (1868). In the case just cited it was also pointed out
that neither the President nor Congress has power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by state
courts. It would follow from this that the power of the
Indiana General Assembly to suspend the privilege would be
confined to the writs of the state courts, and would not
affect the power of the federal courts1 2in the state to issue
writs to issue writs of habeas corpus.
Section XXVIII. Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, and in giving aid and comfort to its enemies.

No annotation.
Section XXIX. No person shall be convicted of treason
except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act, or upon his confession in open court.

No annotation.
Section XXX. No conviction shall work corruption of
blood, or forfeiture of estate.
12. For cases in which this section was discussed see Booth v. State,
179 Ind. 405, 100 N.E. 563 (1913); Sarls v. State, 201 Ind. 88,
166 N.E. 270 (1929).
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This section does away with the ancient common law
rule whereby a conviction of felony not only caused the
felon's estate to be forfeited to the crown but also barred
any estate of inheritance from passing to him, through him,
or from him. There has been little occasion for the Indiana
cases to judicially interpret this section. However this section has several times been considered in federal cases involving the contractual rights of the assured under an insurance policy after he has murdered the name beneficiary
of the policy. Al was held that the provision that the beneficial interest in the policy should revert back to the assured
in case the named beneficiary should predecease him, was
not affected by the fact that the assured murdered the beneficiary. Allen v. Diamond, 13 Fed. (2d) 579 (C.C.A. 7th
Circ., 1926). But it was also held that the provision in the
policy which denied to the assured or his beneficiaries the
right to recover under a double indemnity clause when his
death resulted from a violation of the law-in this case the
assured was executed upon conviction for murder--did not
violate section 30. Diamond v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
50 Fed. (2d) 884 (C.C.A. 7,th Circ. 1931).
Clearly neither of these cases are concerned with the
type of forfeiture or corruption of blood referred to by section 30. In neither was there an attempt by the state to
interfere with the property interests of a felon. Both cases
depended entirely on the contractual agreement made between private parties, and it could hardly be expected that
section 30 would impair these rights.
Section XXXI. No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable
manner, to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor from applying to the General
Assembly for redress of grievances.

This provision has been seldom considered by the Indiana Courts. In Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145
N.E. 550 (1924), it was contended, among other things, that
the city ordinance prohibiting peaceful as well as violent
picketing violated the privilege of peaceable assemblage. In
upholding the ordinance the court pointed out that the ordinance was prohibiting acts, not wrong in themselves, but
committed under such circumstances and in such places as
may result in public disorder and cause breaches of the peace.
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Although due to a later federal supreme court decision, (see
discussion supra section IX) the holding of the Indiana case
is probably no longer the law, the case stands as indicating
that the privilege of assemblage is conditioned upon its being
peaceful, and that a large amount of discretion lies in the
government in determining whether the assemblages are
peaceable or disorderly.
Section XXXII. The people shall have the right to bear
arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.

This section has been considered by the Indiana courts
only in relation to statutes prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons by persons other than travelers. It has been
held that this section is not violated by such statutes; State
v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (1833); McIntyre v. State, 170
Ind. 163, 83 N.E. 1005 (1908) ; thus indicating that although
the privilege to bear arms exists, it is subject to certain
regulations by the state for the purpose of crime prevention,
and public safety.
Section XXXIII. The military shall be kept in strict
subordination to the civil power.

In Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863), it was held
that a provost marshal who, under the orders of a superior
officer, arrested a private individual not connected with the
army, was liable for false imprisonment. Apparently, by
this case, such an arrest may be made only when martial
law has been declared to exist, and martial law may be employed in the home country only when there is an existing
or immediately impending force against legal authority which
civil authority is incompetent to overcome. It was held that
such dangers did not exist at the time of the arrest in question.
Thus, by this case it would appear that the only time
when the military authority in any respect takes the place
of the civil authority is when some force destroys or threatens to destroy the civil authority. And on these occasions
since the military authority is employed only for the purpose of meeting force with force and reestablishing the civil
authority, it can still be said that section 33 is not departed
from.
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Section XXXIV. No soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner;
nor, in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

No annotations.
Section XXXV. The General Assembly shall not grant
any title of nobility, nor confer hereditary distinctions.

No annotations.
Section XXXVI.
prohibited.

Emigration from the State shall not be

No annotations.
Section XXXVIL There shall be neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, within the State, otherwise than for the
punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted. No indenture of any Negro or Mulatto, made and
executed out of the bounds of the State, shall be valid within
the State.

The provisions of this section were made obsolete by
the Thirteenth Amendment of the federal constitution.

